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I. Introduction 
Frankfurt School critical theory is a critical theory of modern capitalist societies. It is critical 
of capitalism because markets and the commodification of everyday life threaten forms of 
action, experience and social organization that members of the Frankfurt School at different 
times have thought to be preconditions of non-pathological individual and social life. 
Adorno’s micrological analyses of damaged life in Minima Moralia are, of course, exemplary 
of this view.1 However, a similar view can be found in the work of Jürgen Habermas, who 
explained in an interview in 1977 that it “may be an idiosyncrasy of mine, or perhaps rather a 
legacy of the Frankfurt School, that, of all these side-effects [of capitalist crisis tendencies], I 
find myself most fascinated by those which jeopardize social and cultural integration – that 
is to say, the potential crises that initially assume socio-psychological form.”2 Habermas’ 
fascination with the socio-psychological costs of the market economy to those participating 
in it is poignant, because he also believes that the market economy is functionally necessary 
for the reproduction of modern societies. 
 
 In The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) this dialectical understanding of markets 
comes to the fore.3  With the two-level concept of society the economic sphere, along with the 
administrative sphere of the modern state, becomes a functionally specified subsystem, 
differentiated out of the lifeworld and governed by the demands of system maintenance. This 
allows Habermas to conceptualise the dialectic of the market in terms of the relationship 
between lifeworld and system in the process of social modernization: one the one hand, the 
rationalization of the lifeworld and the displacement of material reproduction onto the 
economic system is an evolutionary gain in efficiency and steering capacity; on the other 
hand, this “capitalist pattern of modernization is marked by a deformation, a reification of 
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the symbolic structures of the lifeworld under the imperatives of subsystems differentiated 
out via money and power and rendered self-sufficient” (TCA II, 283). In particular, 
Habermas suggests that the economy and the state administration “colonize” the lifeworld 
when they convert action coordination from consensus formation in language to market 
mechanisms or legal regulation (TCA II, 196), and thereby create social pathologies such as 
alienation, anomie and the loss of collective identity (TCA II, 140–48).4    
  
 Habermas’ conceptualization of modern society in The Theory of Communicative Action 
has been controversial. Much of this controversy has focused on the general meta-theoretical 
question of whether his social theory as a whole “cedes too much territory to systems theory” 
and therefore limits the scope of possible social criticism by methodological fiat.5 While this 
criticism concerns both the economy and the administrative institutions of the modern state, 
here I am particularly interested in Habermas’ characterization of the market as a form of 
“norm-free sociality” (TCA II, 171, 307). Commentators have found it very difficult to specify 
what exactly is at stake in this characterization, but many have understood it to mean that 
individual behaviour in market settings, the institutional order of markets and their 
regulation are not governed by the moral and political norms that govern other forms of 
social interaction, and (therefore) are in some sense beyond the scope of moral and political 
appraisal.6 On this critical view, Habermas’ diagnosis of the times in terms of the colonizing 
tendencies of the market comes at the cost of relinquishing the ideal of a rational and 
transparent organization of social labour and material reproduction that is constitutive of 
the Marxist tradition, and he seems to be unable to criticise morally blameworthy individual 
behaviour in the economic sphere.7 
 
 Thus in a 2009 interview Habermas expresses his hope that lessons will be learnt from 
the financial crisis in the language of The Theory of Communicative Action: “My hope is that 
the neoliberal agenda will no longer be accepted at face value but will be open to challenge. 
The whole program of subordinating the lifeworld to the imperatives of the market must be 
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subjected to scrutiny.”8 However, he seems adamant that the blame for the crisis should be 
squarely laid at the door of the political class, rather than the banks and other financial 
institutions. Why? “The speculators, too, were acting consistently within the established 
legal framework, according to the socially recognized logic of profit maximization. Politics 
turns itself into a laughing stock if it resorts to moralizing instead of relying upon the 
enforceable law of the democratic legislator. Politics, and not capitalism, is responsible for 
promoting the common good.” 9  In the same interview Habermas calls compensation 
payments and bonuses for managers outrageous, which sounds a lot like a moral judgment, 
but also notes that the demand for caps on these payments and bonuses is merely 
symptomatic of a larger “legitimation crisis” of capitalism, which sounds a lot like a political 
diagnosis.10 Perhaps the uneasy relationship between the moral norms which we seem to 
invoke when we criticise bankers, hedge fond managers and overpaid executives, and the 
meta-theoretical norm according to which such moral judgments are inappropriate in the 
economic sphere, reflects something about the status of Habermas’ critical theory as a 
diagnosis of the times. 
 
  While Habermas has characterized The Theory of Communicative Action as “hopelessly 
academic”11, he has also drawn attention to its “contemporary-historical motive”, its time-
diagnostic thrust, which concerns Habermas’ fear that the socio-psychological and cultural 
costs extracted by the stabilization of the economy through the bureaucratic welfare state 
give rise to social and political movements which question the value of social rationalization 
per se (TCA I, xli). Against these movements Habermas insists on the progressive potential 
inherent in modern societies and argues that it should be defended against the losses of 
freedom and meaning that modern subjects face from colonization and cultural 
impoverishment. The scope and limitations of such a defence, as Habermas saw them then, 
are hinted at in his 1985 answer to critics, “A Reply” (R).12 He defends the evolutionary value 
of system differentiation even in the face of the colonizing tendencies it engenders and 
suggests that, while the “defensive resteering” necessary to hold the systemic imperatives of 
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the economic and bureaucratic spheres in check “will not be able to succeed without a radical 
and broadly effective democratization”, “there is no longer much prospect of the democratic 
reshaping from within of a differentiated economic system” (R, 261, my emphasis). 
 
 Habermas’ critical diagnosis of the times (Zeitdiagnose) in the 1980s was informed by 
the crisis of the modern welfare state, which struggled to reconcile the economic imperatives 
of the private sector with the funding imperatives of a growing public sector while 
maintaining the legitimacy of welfare system in the light of criticisms from the Left and the 
Right.13 Three decades later, right-wing policies have eroded the welfare state significantly, 
and after the financial crisis it is now less clear than ever whether our economic and political 
systems serve our needs. To be sure, we still don’t know whether the economy can be 
democratized from within, but the question of how to tame it has re-emerged as a moral and 
political question with new urgency.  
 
 If this is right, then distinguishing between the systematic elements of The Theory of 
Communicative Action and its time-diagnostic thrust becomes all-important. This is true 
both of Habermas’ characterization of the market as norm-free and of the colonization thesis. 
In this paper I want to assess how convincing these arguments remain thirty years later. In 
the next section I re-examine Habermas’ conception of the market in the light of some of the 
criticisms that have been levelled against it (II). My suggestion will be that while some of 
these criticisms are unfounded, we have good reasons to revise Habermas’ views about 
norm-freedom. I then turn to the colonization thesis. Since Habermas limits himself to a 
brief analysis of juridification, I want to offer an analysis of commodification in terms of the 
colonization thesis, using the commodification of higher education as my case study (III). My 
conclusion will be that “colonization” remains a suggestive metaphor for our experience of 
social change today, and that Habermas’ version of critical social theory remains timely, if 
amended (IV). 
 




II. Norm-Free Sociality 
What is norm-free sociality? When Habermas characterizes a sphere of social action as 
norm-free, the intended contrast is with spheres of social action whose integration is 
governed by the norms of communicative action oriented toward mutual understanding. 
Thus when he writes that in modern capitalist societies “the market is the most important 
example of a norm-free regulation of cooperative contexts” (TCA II, 150, cf. 171), the 
intended contrast is with the regulation of cooperative contexts through consensus 
formation in language. More generally, Habermas distinguishes between two ways in which 
action systems may be integrated: whereas social integration works through consensus, 
“whether normatively guaranteed or communicatively achieved”, system integration works 
through the “nonnormative steering of individual decisions not subjectively coordinated” 
(TCA II, 150). And, according to Habermas’ theory of social evolution, “modern societies 
attain a level of system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are 
connected with one another via delinguistified media of communication: these systemic 
mechanisms – for example, money – steer a social intercourse that has been largely 
disconnected from norms and values, above all in those subsystems of purposive rational 
economic and administrative action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of 
their moral-political foundations” (TCA II, 154). 
 
 All objections to this characterization of the economy insist that “all economies…are 
moral economies.”14 At least three such objections can be distinguished. My suggestion is 
that while these objections are only partially justified once the scope and diagnostic 
character of The Theory of Communicative Action is properly appreciated, we nevertheless 
have good reasons to take a different view on the substantive claims advanced. The 
objections concern: (1) the connection between types of action, types of action coordination 
and spheres of social action; (2) the role of moral and ethical considerations in the 
organization of labour; and (3) the possibility of moral appraisal in the economic sphere.  




1. Types of action, types of action coordination and spheres of social action 
As we have seen, Habermas seems to endorse a conceptual connection between 
communicative action, action coordination through consensus formation in language and 
social integration on the one hand, and purposive action, action coordination through 
“nonnormative steering” and system integration on the other. However, according to some 
critics, such a connection must be implausible, since “every societal sphere of action exhibits 
a wealth of different types of action.”15 In particular, the economic and bureaucratic spheres 
rely on communicative as well as purposive rationality.16 In his 1985 “Reply,” Habermas 
acknowledges that “the expression ‘norm-free sociality’ has led to misunderstandings” (R, 
256) and offers this clarification: 
It is obvious that commercial enterprises and government offices, indeed economic 
and political contexts as a whole make use of communicative action that is embedded 
in a normative framework. Leaving aside the fact that the functional contexts of 
media-steered subsystems cannot simply be marked off topologically from one 
another and made to match certain institutional complexes, my thesis amounts 
merely to the assertion that the integration of these action systems is in the final 
instance not based on the potential for social integration of communicative actions 
and the lifeworldly background thereof – and these systems make use of both. (R, 
257) 
 
This may seem like a major revision but, in fact, it merely restates what Habermas has 
already argued in The Theory of Communicative Action itself. To begin with, as “formally 
organised” subsystems, the economic and bureaucratic spheres are first constituted through 
law (TCA II, 309), and that means, in the case of the economic sphere, not only the private 
law of person, property and contract, but also the more substantive legal regulation of 
employment law, for example (cf. TCA II, 361). More importantly, Habermas also notes that 
“it is not only (or even chiefly) by way of the purposive-rational action of members that 
organizations resolve problems of self-maintenance. We may not assume, even in the case of 
the capitalist economic organization and the modern state organization, any linear 
dependency of organizational rationality on the rationality of members’ actions” (TCA II, 
306). Even in formally organised domains of action the mechanism of mutual understanding 
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is merely “partially rescinded” (TCA II, 309), because all formal organisation relies on 
informal organisation. “Informal organization covers those legitimately regulated, 
innerorganizational relations that, notwithstanding the juridification of the framework, may 
be moralized. The lifeworlds of members, never completely husked away, penetrate here into 
the reality of organizations” (TCA II, 311). This explains, for example, why it is wrong to 
suggest that Habermas cannot explain how partners in economic exchange can trust each 
other – surely a requirement of economic exchange.17 
 
 To be sure, some critics have asked whether Habermas both can have his cake and eat it. 
Thus, according to Honneth, Habermas “cannot ascribe a moral infrastructure to the 
capitalist economic sphere, even if he sometimes admits that the modern organisation of 
labour is characterised by certain norms.” This is because the very distinction between 
system and lifeworld depends on the fact that action coordination in the system occurs “only 
through the mediation of purposively-rational, strategic attitudes”, while in the lifeworld it 
requires moral attitudes.18 However, for Habermas the distinctive feature of a system is its 
functionalist rationality, rather than the strategic attitudes that actors in it assume. Thus, 
while he insists that the distinction between system and lifeworld and their uncoupling is not 
only an analytic distinction but also a historical trend (R, 257–58), he need not insist that 
communicative action is completely absent from the economic and bureaucratic spheres, just 
as he need not insist that strategic action is completely absent from the lifeworld.19 Rather, 
Habermas insists that communicative action “forfeits its validity basis” in that, as members 
of organizations, people “act communicatively only with reservation. They know they can 
have recourse to formal regulations, not only in exceptional but in routine cases; there is no 
necessity for achieving consensus by communicative means” (TCA II, 310–11). This 
distinction seems apt; it establishes a connection between two forms of action coordination 
and two spheres of social action in an ideal-typical fashion without reifying it. Functionalist 
imperatives constrain actors in the economic and bureaucratic systems, but they do not 
reduce actors’ actions to purposively-rational, strategic attitudes.20  




2. Moral and ethical considerations in the organization of labour 
According to Habermas, the uncoupling of system and lifeworld and the displacement of the 
material reproduction of society onto the economic system is an advance from the 
perspective of social evolution. The increasing social complexity of modern societies 
threatens to overburden the lifeworld’s capacity to steer social reproduction; hence, the 
replacement of mutual understanding in language with delinguistified steering media for the 
tasks of material reproduction is one of the “relief mechanisms” (cf. TCA II, 181) that free up 
lifeworld resources for the complex tasks of symbolic reproduction. 21  Moreover, the 
“intrinsic evolutionary value exhibited per se by steering media such as money and power” 
shows itself in their greater efficiency in the material reproduction of society (R, 261). As we 
have seen before, the contrast is with societies with a lower degree of social differentiation, 
where system integration and material reproduction remain tightly linked with social 
integration and symbolic reproduction. And nowhere is this clearer than in the sphere of 
social labour, where the commodification of labour power in the course of capitalist 
modernization destroyed those traditional lifeworlds, which were defined by this tight link of 
symbolic and material reproduction (Feudal societies are obvious examples). Habermas is 
very aware of this conflicted history, and his reconstruction of the normalization of wage 
labour in modern capitalist societies is very instructive. 
 
 According to this reconstruction, the uncoupling of lifeworld and system is accompanied 
by the formation of interchange relations between them. From the perspective of the 
lifeworld these interchange relations take the form of social roles. Thus, the “employment 
system regulates its interchanges with the lifeworld via the role of a member of an 
organization” (TCA II, 320), a role “constituted in legal form” (TCA II, 321). Actors who 
assume this role “detach themselves from lifeworld contexts and adapt themselves to 
formally organized domains of action”, such as firms or corporations, where “they make 
some organization-specific contribution and are compensated for it (normally in the form of 
Published in Constellations 20:4 (2013): 587–603. 
 
 9 
wages or salaries)” (TCA II, 321). From the perspective of the system the actors’ concrete 
labour is transformed into abstract labour as input and exchanged for wages as output (TCA 
II, 322). Habermas acknowledges that the emergence of wage labour is a revolutionary 
change in the organization of social labour and that its eventual normalization was preceded 
by countless social struggles. However, he insists that “the new organizational forms gained 
wide acceptance and considerable permanency on the strength of their greater effectiveness 
and superior level of integration.” More specifically, he insists that the “functionalist 
rationality” of the capitalist mode of production consists in the fact that it “can better fulfill 
the tasks of materially reproducing the lifeworld” than the Feudal mode of production could 
(TCA II, 321). This is particularly true in the social-welfare state. 
In the social-welfare state, the roles provided by the occupational system become, so 
to speak, normalized. Within the framework of post-traditional lifeworlds, the 
structural differentiation of employment within organizations is no foreign element 
in any case; the burdens resulting from the character of heteronomously determined 
work are made at least subjectively bearable – if not through “humanizing” the 
workplace, through providing monetary rewards and legally guaranteed securities – 
and are largely headed off in this way, along with other disadvantages and risks 
stemming from the status of workers and employees. (TCA II, 349)  
 
Finally, Habermas suggests that “the role of employee loses its debilitating proletarian 
features” as a result of the welfare-state compromise (TCA II, 349). From the perspective of a 
critical social theory the question remains, however, whether “heteronomously determined 
work” is the price to be paid for improved standards of living and the promise of social 
security. 
 
 Recent writing in critical theory suggests that the questions of meaningful work and the 
democratic organization of social labour have not entirely disappeared from the ambit of 
social criticism. And some of this writing takes Habermas’ seeming acquiescence to 
heteronomously determined work as its starting point.22 Thus according to Keith Breen, 
Habermas’ characterization of the market “veils important moral-ethical counterarguments 
to market capitalism, one of the most significant being that under capitalism the productive 
capacities of human beings suffer avertable distortion.” Since Habermas justifies the current 
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organization of labour in terms of its efficiency in dealing with systemic complexity, he 
denies any importance to the character of human relationships in production and the 
potential emancipatory impact of work. As a result, “[t]he injustices, hardships, and 
drudgery suffered by men and women in their working lives are therefore no longer 
attributable to human agency and deliberate design, but issue instead from a reified and 
immutable logic.”23 In a similar vein, Honneth argues that Habermas’ characterization of the 
economic sphere as norm-free makes it impossible to problematize the quality of work in 
critical social theory. However, unlike Breen, Honneth is acutely aware of the limits of any 
attempt to locate the emancipatory potential of work in the organic or autonomous character 
of production considered as craft. Not all necessary work can have this character, and the 
normative dimension of work in the economic sphere therefore must concern the social 
organization of labour, rather than its intrinsic character.24 Honneth’s criticism of Habermas 
can now be stated more precisely than in §II.1: if it can be shown that capitalist labour 
markets functionally require moral norms, if labour markets must be able to integrate 
socially as well as systemically, then Habermas’ distinction between lifeworld and system as 
spheres of social action is redundant, and it is possible to criticize contemporary work 
practices in terms of these moral norms.25 What are these norms? 
 
 Honneth draws on Hegel and Durkheim in order to specify the norms that would 
legitimize the modern market economy. From Hegel he takes the idea that the legitimacy of 
capitalism depends on its ability to meet two normative conditions: first, it must make it 
possible for individuals to secure through their labour the necessary means of subsistence for 
themselves and their families at an adequate level; second, it must make it possible for 
individual workers to be socially recognized as making through their labour a contribution to 
the common good.26 From Durkheim Honneth takes the idea that the contribution of the 
market economy to social integration must take the form of a particular kind of solidarity, 
organic solidarity, which obtains when workers experience their labour as a “joint, 
cooperative effort for the common good.”27 And it is a precondition of organic solidarity that 
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the social division of labour is fair and transparent, so that individual workers can 
comprehend their own role and that of others in the system of production. Of course, 
Honneth is aware of the fact that modern market economies and their labour markets rarely 
meet Hegel’s and Durkheim’s conditions. However, he argues that they retain their critical 
force. In other words, Honneth can acknowledge that today’s deregulated labour markets do 
not meet the normative conditions that would legitimize the market economy, but insist that 
these conditions can be mobilized as “moral resources” in order to question the existing 
economic arrangements. For present purposes Honneth’s central claim is that this normative 
perspective on the organization of labour and the legitimacy of the market economy emerges 
only if we analyze the economy as a sphere of social integration rather than of system 
integration.28  
 
 I am very sympathetic to the substance of Honneth’s argument, and I expect most critical 
theorists are. However, the question is whether the critical force of these arguments really is 
not available to Habermas because of his reliance on the two-level concept of society. 
Presumably the question of the legitimacy of the market economy arises, on Habermas’ 
conception of it, when it is uncoupled from the lifeworld and the interchange relations 
between the economic system and the lifeworld are first institutionalized (or subsequently 
re-institutionalized as the relationship between system and lifeworld changes). As we have 
seen, on his interpretation historical struggles about the commodification of labour and the 
development of the employee role have indeed taken place, and they have been pacified, at 
least in Germany29, because the rise of the social-welfare state has provided institutional 
safeguards against the risks unemployment and impoverishment. This is a substantive claim 
of social explanation, rather than the result of a methodological decision, and, most 
importantly, it suggests that the process of uncoupling is not irreversible, as Habermas 
explicitly notes.30  
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 In fact, Habermas’ time-diagnosis in The Theory of Communicative Action and his 1984 
lecture on the crisis of the welfare state suggests that the relationship between the economy, 
the state and the lifeworld is fraught already.31 As is well known, Habermas is very aware of 
the inherent limits to social-welfare provision. Most importantly, the welfare state no longer 
manages to secure full employment, and the unemployed are marginalized socially, 
economically and politically despite the material support that they continue to receive. And 
in the last thirty years the situation has deteriorated significantly. As observers of German 
politics know, the current low unemployment figures conceal the deregulation of labour 
markets and the casualization of labour at an unprecedented scale that introduced 
phenomena such as the working poor and people working multiple jobs into the German 
labour market. Structural changes such as these have the potential to re-politicize labour. 
 
 Of course, it is an open question whether such a re-politicization of labour would make it 
possible for modern societies to meet the normative conditions of a legitimate market 
economy, as Honneth sees them. In particular, it is questionable whether complex modern 
economies can exhibit the features of organic solidarity – fairness and transparency – that 
would enable workers to experience their labour as a “joint, cooperative effort for the 
common good.” As we have seen already, Habermas expresses such skepticism about the 
democratization of labour, not least because of the functionalist constraints of the economic 
system.32 Instead he focuses on democratic resources in the lifeworld: 
We are faced with the problem of how capabilities for self-organization can be 
developed to such an extent within autonomous public spheres that [a] radical 
democratic process of will-formation can come to have a decisive impact on the 
regulatory mechanisms and marginal conditions of media-steered subsystems in a 
lifeworld oriented toward use values, toward ends in general. This task involves 
holding the systemic imperatives of an interventionist state apparatus and those of an 
economic system in check, and is formulated in defensive terms. Yet, this defensive 
resteering will not be able to succeed without a radical and broadly effective 
democratization. (R, 261) 
 
To be sure, one reason why Habermas is worried about locating the normative foundations 
of social criticism in the “utopian ideal of a society based on social labour” is the fact that the 
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active labour force is a shrinking constituency in Western European societies.33 Nevertheless, 
as long as a significant proportion of people do contribute to society through their labour, 
and as long as meaningful work is an important part of human flourishing, critical theorists 
should remain worried about the character of that work, and this might require its re-
politicization in some sense. Perhaps Habermas is too sanguine here; but it seems to me that 
this is due to a substantive sociological judgment and not to his choice of methodology.34 
 
3. Moral appraisal in the economic sphere 
The financial crisis has focused attention on moral responsibility in the market economy. As 
we have seen in §I, Habermas’ own comments are at best ambivalent. On the one hand, he 
insists that the neoliberal agenda needs to be attacked, and he seems outraged at the bloated 
bonuses received by bankers and other executives. On the other hand, he insists that they 
“were acting consistently within the established legal framework, according to the socially 
recognized logic of profit maximization.”35 And, presumably, that includes bloated pay and 
bonuses. Habermas’ proposed solution is better regulation, and this is surely right, but he 
says surprisingly little about the blameworthy behaviour of individuals. This silence is of 
course closely related to the characterization of the market as norm-free. On this 
characterization actors in the economic sphere simply do not draw on the “moral resources” 
that are available to them in the lifeworld in order to evaluate individual conduct. In The 
Theory of Communicative Action Habermas uses language reminiscent of Lukács in order to 
describe the phenomenology of economic and bureaucratic action. “Members behave toward 
formally organized action systems, steered via processes of exchange and power, as toward a 
block of quasi-natural reality; within these media-steered subsystems society congeals into a 
second nature” (TCA II, 154, cf. 173). The reason for this reification of consciousness is that 
in the economic and bureaucratic spheres “[n]orm-conformative attitudes and identity-
forming social memberships are neither necessary nor possible…they are made peripheral 
instead” (TCA II, 154). In economic action subjects move from an orientation toward mutual 
understanding to a strategic attitude in which they pursue their own goals, rather than 
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collectively agreed goals, through their responses to price signals. Economic action is thereby 
“ethically neutralized,” because “normatively embedded interactions are turned into success-
oriented transactions among private legal subjects” (TCA II, 178). 
 
 As Habermas also points out, one manifestation of this ethical neutralization is the 
disappearance of individual responsibility from the economic sphere.  
Delinguistified media of communication such as money and power, connect up 
interactions in space and time into more and more complex networks that no one has 
to comprehend or be responsible for. If by ‘responsibility’ we mean that one orients 
one’s actions to criticizable validity claims, then a ‘deworlded’ coordination of action 
that is unhinged from communicatively established consensus does not require that 
participants be responsible actors. (TCA II, 184) 
 
In the extreme case, personal responsibility is not merely watered down because the complex 
transactions of modern economies make it impossible to anticipate all the consequences of 
one’s actions,36 but also because actors do not orient their actions to criticizable validity 
claims. In other words, action is not constrained by the possible agreement of others, as 
action oriented toward mutual understanding is. Clearly, moral responsibility cannot be 
attributed to agents, if a form of action does not require that they orient themselves with 
respect to the claims that others may have on them. To put it in a slogan: for Habermas, 
business ethics is not an oxymoron but a category mistake.37 
 
 However, it is far from obvious whether this disappearance of responsibility in the 
economic sphere is irreversible. Recall that it is one of Habermas’ aims in The Theory of 
Communicative Action to show that the rationalization of the lifeworld and the uncoupling 
of lifeworld and system do not necessarily lead to social pathologies, such as alienation, 
anomie and the loss of collective identity (cf. TCA II, 140–48). More precisely, it does not 
lead to such pathologies if “differentiating between system and lifeworld and reproducing 
some kind of modern economy and political state are in the general interest of all those who 
participate in a modern lifeworld and have the corresponding postconventional moral and 
cultural collective identities that it presupposes.”38 As we have seen in §II.2, in the case of the 
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commodification of labour this took the form of showing that as long as certain conditions 
were met (the welfare-state protections against unemployment, health care and pension 
provisions amongst others), members of modern societies have accepted the legitimacy of 
the employment system despite “heteronomously determined work.” However, we have also 
seen that a re-politicization of labour remains possible, if these conditions change. According 
to a parallel argument we can assume that the legitimacy of the market economy as a sphere 
of social action in which individuals may pursue their subjective ends in a self-interested way 
without regard to others’ interests is dependent upon the continuous belief that this is the 
best way of organizing the material reproduction of society in terms of efficiency and fairness. 
This belief can be shaken in at least two ways. On the one hand, systemic failure can 
convince us that we must reform the “basic structure” of the economy in order to prevent 
future crises. However, on the other hand, we can also notice that reckless and immoral 
behaviour of particular individuals and corporations has exacerbated the crisis; not only 
have some exploited and entrapped others for personal or corporate gain, but some 
corporations have knowingly put the entire financial system at risk. Perhaps one lesson of 
the financial crisis is that it is insufficient for the background rules or the “basic structure” of 
the economy to be fair, whereas action within the economic sphere is beyond moral appraisal. 
As G.A. Cohen has argued convincingly in a different context, for a society to be just it is not 
sufficient that its basic structure is just, action within that structure must be just, too.39 From 
a Habermasian perspective the obvious danger of immoral behaviour in the market is a 
breakdown in social solidarity. Contrary to what Habermas suggests in the 2009 interview, 
people are not merely populist when they criticize bloated bonuses and pay, they protest 
against the fact that some become rich on the back of others’ poverty, and that some people’s 
livelihoods have been lost in order to make rich people richer. 
 
   If this is right, then the economy is not norm-free, because its legitimacy depends on its 
ability to organize the material reproduction of society efficiently and fairly. This is not to say 
that agents’ individual choices must be coordinated centrally, democratically or otherwise. 
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Habermas is right to be skeptical about the prospects of radical democratic self-organization. 
But it means that those who willfully or recklessly put this ability at risk should be criticized: 
we need a theory of moral appraisal in the market as well as a theory of the just basic 
structure. Perhaps this indicates a future research direction for critical theory. 
 
III. The Colonization Thesis: A Case Study 
The colonization thesis is the central time-diagnostic claim that Habermas advances in The 
Theory of Communicative Action in order to grasp the potentially destructive power of the 
market. As we have seen, according to Habermas, the process of social rationalization leads 
to a dialectic of enlightenment or a paradox of modernity (cf. TCA I, xl), which consists in the 
fact that “the rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a heightening of systemic 
complexity, which becomes so hypertrophied that it unleashes system imperatives that burst 
the capacity of the lifeworld they instrumentalize” (TCA II, 155). In the light of this 
development the colonization thesis is the claim that “[i]n the end, systemic mechanisms 
suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus-dependent 
coordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the 
lifeworld is at stake. In these areas, the mediatization of the lifeworld assumes the form of a 
colonization” (TCA II, 196). I have argued elsewhere that the “cannot” in this passage is 
ambiguous; it can indicate a functionalist claim or a claim about normative expectations 
(about a particular social practice or institution).40 In my view, the latter view is correct. To 
be sure, mediatization becomes colonization when money and power encroach upon 
processes of symbolic reproduction (leading to social pathologies), but this colonization is 
experienced as a normative wrong, because it violates legitimate expectations about the 
scope and limits of such an encroachment relative to the purposes or integrity of the 
colonized practice or institution. Thus when Habermas points to the real conflict between a 
“strictly pedagogical approach to instruction” and “the economic system-imperative to 
uncouple the school system from the fundamental right to education and to close-circuit it 
with the employment system” (TCA II, 371), he points to a normative conflict about the value 
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of education in our society and not merely to the danger of its dysfunctional symbolic 
reproduction.41 In the remainder of this paper I want to take my lead from Habermas’ 
diagnosis of colonization and offer an example of commodification-as-colonization, the 
commodification of higher education. I hope to illuminate the diagnostic strength of 
Habermasian critical theory by showing how it can make sense of this process. 
 
1. The commodification of higher education 
The discussion of higher education in terms of system and lifeworld is not alien to Habermas. 
In a 1986 lecture he describes how the “idea of the university” as Humboldt, Schelling and 
Schleiermacher conceived of it is mobilized again and again against a system of higher 
education that “has become functionally autonomous, and which is less and less in need of 
normative integration in the minds of professors and students the more it comes to be 
steered by systemic mechanisms and oriented to the environments of the economy and 
administrative planning through the production by the individual disciplines of technically 
usable information and professional qualifications.”42 According to the classical idea, the 
university has a central place in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, because the 
philosophical reflection at the heart of science and scholarship shapes culture as a whole and 
serves the purposes of enlightenment and emancipation. And while this idea was perhaps 
always naïve, and its ambitious aims were never realized, there is a kernel of truth in it, 
because “the learning processes that take place within the university not only enter into an 
exchange with the economy and administration but also stand in an inner relationship to the 
functions through which the lifeworld reproduces itself.”43 They socialize lifeworld members 
into the scientific mode of thought, contribute to social and political discourses and further 
the hermeneutic self-understanding of the culture as a whole. Above all, Habermas stresses 
the communicative dimension of academic practice, and the contribution that this practice 
makes to society as a whole. 
The egalitarian and universalistic content of its forms of argumentation expresses 
only the norms of scientific and scholarly activity, not those of society as a whole. But 
they share emphatically in the communicative rationality in whose forms modern 
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societies, that is, societies which are not fixed once and for all and which have no 
guiding images, must reach an understanding about themselves.44    
 
 Many defenders of public higher education today defend it in similar terms to Habermas. 
In the wake of the Browne Report on the financing of higher education in the United 
Kingdom (2010), which conceives higher education as a private good, a number of academics 
in the humanities and the social sciences (but also some natural scientists) have argued that 
it should not be reduced to private benefits but seen as collectively valuable, both in 
monetary and in non-monetary terms.45 For example, Stefan Collini clearly assumes that the 
intrinsic goods brought about by scholarship in the humanities are not limited to those who 
pursue such scholarship, but are available more widely throughout society (though he thinks 
it unwise to use this argument in order to argue for the “usefulness” of the humanities).46 
More specifically, Collini rejects the reduction of scholarship in the humanities to the 
production of useful knowledge or skills, even though he notes that such knowledge and 
skills often are produced through such scholarship:  
[O]ne has to make, over and over again, the obvious point that a society does not 
educate the next generation in order for them to contribute to its economy. It 
educates them in order that they should extend and deepen their understanding of 
themselves and the world, acquiring, in the course of this form of growing up, kinds 
of knowledge and skills which will be useful in their eventual employment, but which 
will no more be the sum of their education than that employment will be the sum of 
their lives.47 
 
In fact, Collini recognizes that humanities scholarship serves the “preservation, cultivation, 
and transmission of a cultural tradition”, that is, the processes that Habermas names 
cultural reproduction.48  
 
 Other critics point to the role of the public university in processes of social integration 
and socialization. John Holmwood argues that one important role of the university, 
considered as a public university, is to improve the quality of public debate and discussion. 
As social complexity grows, the role of expertise in public policy-making increases, but at the 
same time “expertise” itself becomes problematic: “The increasingly embedded character of 
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expert knowledge within corporations and government serves to de-legitimate expertise 
precisely by these forms of associations.” If public debate is not to be reduced to populism, 
the public university has a crucial role to play as an intellectual force whose claim to 
knowledge is not tainted by corporate or governmental interest.49 If this is right, then the 
commodification of higher education corrupts its purposes in at least two ways. First, it 
opens up research and teaching to the imperatives of the market and relinquishes the 
independence that is the basis of its legitimacy. Second, the introduction of competition 
between universities through differentiated tuition fees “undermines the social mission of 
universities in terms of the democratization of higher education”, because it will lead to a 
division between students from poorer backgrounds who will seek out cheaper, more 
vocationally oriented universities and more wealthy students who will seek out prestigious 
research universities charging higher fees. As Holmwood puts it: “It is systematic 
government policy designed to dismantle fifty years of educational policy that sought to 
establish education as a social right.”50 As Diane Reay has shown, not only does this 
“education apartheid” exclude the less wealthy sectors of the population from the 
competition for the best jobs, it also excludes them from the ranks of the informed, critical 
public, reinforcing the existing “class apartheid” of British society.51 It is easy to see how the 
commodification of higher education will further erode solidarity and strengthen alienation 
and anomie amongst those willfully excluded from access to education and social mobility.  
 
2. Commodification as colonization 
Is the commodification of higher education best understood as a form of colonization? I 
believe that some its decisive characteristics speak in favour of the colonization thesis as a 
diagnostic tool. The history of the commodification of higher education broadly follows the 
history of colonization that Habermas sketches in The Theory of Communicative Action. 
“The thesis of internal colonization states that the subsystems of the economy and state 
become more and more complex as a consequence of capitalist growth, and penetrate ever 
deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld” (TCA II, 367). In the case of the 
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commodification of higher education (and other public services) it is possible to identify a 
historical trajectory whereby state investment in higher education has decreased, often in 
order to curtail public expenditure, at the same time as student numbers have risen 
dramatically, both because higher education was seen as the road to upward social mobility 
and because a highly educated workforce was seen as a prerequisite of further economic 
growth. Governments and universities have addressed the subsequent shortfall of higher 
education funding through a shift to a consumer model of higher education, whereby 
students (and their parents) fund their education privately and are supported indirectly by 
the state through a complex supporting web of government-secured loans and tax credits. 
The result of this model for universities is that they now compete for students in a market, 
and their ability to survive in that market depends on their academic and non-academic 
offerings satisfying student preferences. At the same time, universities have sought to 
insulate themselves from the vagaries of government support by seeking third-party funding 
for academic research and by seeking to exploit commercial opportunities presented by their 
research.52  
 
 If this is right, then the commodification of higher education is indeed driven by 
colonization. Universities are forced to compete in markets for students and research 
funding, because the imperatives of the economic subsystem leave them no other choice but 
to assimilate their behaviour to market imperatives. As a result, strategic attitudes oriented 
at market success replace communicative action oriented toward reaching cooperative goals 
in many areas of university policy, including student recruitment and curriculum planning 
and the choice of research topics.53 The purposes and integrity of academic teaching and 
research are put at risk by the pressure to compete in the market for students and research 
funding. 
 
 However, there is an important challenge to this view, which stresses the extent to which 
the commodification of higher education originates in the universities themselves. This 
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challenge is initially an observation about the changing behaviour of US universities, in 
which both academics and professional staff have begun to pursue entrepreneurial goals of 
their own accord. 54  But for present purposes the challenge goes to the heart of the 
colonization thesis, because the thesis suggests that markets are imposed upon lifeworld 
institutions from the outside. In evaluating this challenge it is very important to keep in 
mind that much of the current commodification of teaching and research is a response to the 
imperatives of the market. It is certainly true, for example, that English universities have 
come a long way in marketing higher education and the “student experience” that 
encapsulates it as a consumer good, and that many US universities aggressively pursue the 
commercial exploitation of their intellectual property, but I am inclined to interpret these 
trends as responses to colonization rather than as indicating the need for an alternative 
explanation. 
 
 Nevertheless, the scope and speed of the commodification of higher education raises an 
important question about acquiescence and resistance. According to Habermas’ theory of 
social evolution we would expect the subjection of material reproduction to market norms to 
gain legitimacy over time, given the social-welfare guarantees discussed in §II.2, while the 
subjection of symbolic reproduction to commodification or juridification would evince 
“stubborn and possibly successful resistance” (TCA II, 351). But while the commodification 
of higher education in the UK has evinced some resistance, ranging from student 
demonstrations to the publication of a flurry of non-academic and academic pamphlets, 
manifestos and books,55 there does not seem to be wider social resistance beyond those who 
have a current interest in higher education (students and academics). I want to suggest that 
Habermas’ analysis of the fragmentation of consciousness is helpful in understanding this 
lack of resistance and, at the same time, points to the need of a new theory of ideology.  
 
 According to Habermas’ theory of social rationalization, the product of ideology, false 
consciousness, is replaced by fragmented consciousness. 56  In the process of the 
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rationalization of the lifeworld traditional ideologies lose their power, but this does not 
render social organization transparent. Rather, the functional role of ideology, meeting the 
need for interpretation, is taken over by the absence of such interpretation. “The lifeworld is 
always constituted in the form of global knowledge intersubjectively shared by its members; 
thus, the desired equivalent for no longer available ideologies might simply consist in the 
fact that the everyday knowledge appearing in totalized form remains diffuse…Everyday 
consciousness is robbed of its power to synthesize; it becomes fragmented” (TCA II, 355). 
The differentiation of value spheres and the formation of expert cultures within these 
spheres make it impossible to view the lifeworld holistically, and this cultural 
impoverishment drains the lifeworld of the resources that its members need in order to 
reach understanding over their collective situation. As Habermas notes: “This 
communicative infrastructure is threatened by two interlocking, mutually reinforcing 
tendencies: systematically induced reification and cultural impoverishment” (TCA II, 327).   
Colonization and cultural impoverishment go hand in hand, because once the latter has 
impoverished the lifeworld of critical resources, “the imperatives of autonomous subsystems 
make their way into the lifeworld from the outside – like colonial masters coming into a 
tribal society – and force a process of assimilation upon it” (TCA II, 355). 
 
 On the one hand, this is a plausible picture of our current predicament: the colonization 
of the lifeworld is the result of systemic crises in media-steered systems, and it meets little 
resistance because cultural impoverishment has robbed us of the critical resources that 
would enable us to resist colonization; we are unfree because fragmented consciousness 
“blocks enlightenment by the mechanism of reification” (TCA II, 355).57 On the other hand, it 
is an implausible picture: it does not accommodate the normative discourse of 
commodification that paves the way for colonization. It is the discourse of neoliberal 
ideology, according to which deregulation, privatization and competition are not merely 
necessary but also good, and according to which markets are not merely efficient but also 
promote freedom. On Habermas’ account, it seems as if the economic imperatives trump 
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lifeworld resistance because there are no normative resources on which lifeworld members 
can draw in order to resist them. But, in fact, economic imperatives also dominate because a 
neoliberal ideology actively furthers their cause. The pernicious influence of neoliberal 
ideology on public policy has been demonstrated.58 We need a theory of ideology to resist it. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to examine Habermas’ conception of the market in The 
Theory of Communicative Action. I have divided this task into two main parts. In §II, I have 
examined in detail whether Habermas’ characterization of the market as norm-free commits 
him to implausible claims about the relationship between types of action, types of action 
coordination and spheres of social action, whether it prevents him from recognizing the 
norms governing the social organization of labour, and whether it makes it impossible for 
him to conceive of the market as a moral sphere. I have suggested that where Habermas’ 
arguments fail to convince, this seems due to Habermas’ substantive social explanation 
rather than to his choice of methodology. In particular, I have suggested that the neoliberal 
turn in the last 30 years may lead to a repoliticization of labour, and that we need a theory of 
morality in the market. 
  
 In §III, I have argued that the colonization thesis is a plausible diagnostic tool and 
offered the commodification of higher education as an example. I have shown that it fits the 
pattern of commodification-as-colonization, but I also have suggested that we still need a 
theory of ideology. Overall, my feeling is that where Habermas’ criticism of capitalism and 
markets is not as radical as many of us wish it were this is due to his pessimism about 
meaningful alternatives, rather than to an alleged methodological straightjacket of The 
Theory of Communicative Action.59  And I have made suggestions about where his theory 
should be amended.  
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